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ABSTRACT
As the indispensable trading platforms of the ecosystem, hundreds
of cryptocurrency exchanges are emerging to facilitate the trading
of digital assets. While, it also attracts the attentions of attackers.
A number of scam attacks were reported targeting cryptocurrency
exchanges, leading to a huge mount of financial loss. However, no
previous work in our research community has systematically stud-
ied this problem. In this paper, we make the first effort to identify
and characterize the cryptocurrency exchange scams. We first iden-
tify over 1,500 scam domains and over 300 fake apps, by collecting
existing reports and using typosquatting generation techniques.
Then we investigate the relationship between them, and identify
94 scam domain families and 30 fake app families. We further char-
acterize the impacts of such scams, and reveal that these scams
have incurred financial loss of 520k US dollars at least. We fur-
ther observe that the fake apps have been sneaked to major app
markets (including Google Play) to infect unsuspicious users. Our
findings demonstrate the urgency to identify and prevent cryp-
tocurrency exchange scams. To facilitate future research, we have
publicly released all the identified scam domains and fake apps to
the community.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the first Bitcoin block was mined back in 2009, cryptocur-
rency has seen an explosive growth thanks to the evolvement of
blockchain technology and their economic ecosystems. Besides
BitCoin, thousands of unique cryptocurrencies have popped up
from time to time. As of the end of 2018, there are over 2,000 differ-
ent cryptocurrencies, and the total market capitalization is $100bn,
which is higher than the GDP of 127 countries [7].
As the indispensable trading platforms of the ecosystem, hun-
dreds of cryptocurrency exchanges are emerging to facilitate the
trading of digital assets (e.g., Bitcoin) with both traditional fiat
currencies (e.g., US dollars) or other digital assets (e.g., Ether).
Inevitably, the prosperity of cryptocurrency exchanges are great
targets for hackers to perform attacks to make a profit. A number
of exchanges have been targeted by large-scale hacking attacks. It
is reported that the cryptocurrency exchanges suffered a total loss
of $882 million due to targeted attacks in 2017 and in the first three
quarters of 2018[1]. The number keeps increasing in 2019. For ex-
ample, as reported in May 2019, attackers have stolen 7,000 bitcoins
(which worth $41m) from Binance, one of the top leading exchanges
all over the world, using a variety of techniques, including phishing,
viruses and other attacks[2]. The exchange Coinhouse suffered a
phishing attack on September 2019, and attackers gained access to
all the user names and email addresses[6]. It is worth noting that,
many attacks are relying on the social engineering techniques, i.e.,
phishing and trust-trading scams.
It is urgent to identify and prevent scam attacks targeting ex-
changes. The blockchain community has started to pay attention to
the scam attacks in the cryptocurrency ecosystem. For example, sev-
eral open-source databases (e.g., CryptoScamDB and EtherscamDB)
have collected malicious domains and their associated addresses
that have the intent of deceiving people for the purposes of finan-
cial gain by using a crowd-sourcing based approach (e.g., being
actively reported by victims), although only a few of them are re-
lated to cryptocurrency exchanges. To the best of our knowledge,
no previous study in our research community has made efforts to
investigate this problem. We are still unaware: 1) to the extent the
scams exist in the ecosystem; and 2) who are the attackers behind
them; and 3) what are the impacts of the scams.
Our Study. In this paper, we make the first effort to look at
the cryptocurrency exchange scams. To cover as much scams as
possible, we first use a hybrid approach by first collecting existing
known scams and then developing an automated approach, to iden-
tify both well-known scams and scams that have not been disclosed
to public (see Section 4). We have identified 1, 595 scam domains,
and over 60% of them are not publicly known. Besides, we have
identified over 300 fake exchange apps. Based on the harvested
dataset, we propose to cluster the domains and apps, and further
investigate the relationship between them (see Section 5). We have
identified 94 scam domain families and 30 fake app families. At last,
we have investigated the distribution channels of such scams, and
their real-world impacts by analyzing their associated blockchain
addresses (see Section 6).
In summary, we make the following main research contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first sys-
tematic study of the cryptocurrency exchange scams.
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We collected by far the largest exchange scam dataset, and
performed deep analysis of them, including the attackers and
impacts. Most of the identified scams have not been known
to the community.
• Wehave revealed that amajority of the scam domains
and fake apps were created and controlled by a small
number of groups (attackers), which could be useful for
us to further identify and track the new scams in the future.
• We have revealed over 182 blockchain addresses re-
lated to such scams. We also identify 518 addresses as-
sociated to them, which are quite possible to be controlled
by the same group of people. Such information could be
used to track the money flow of the scam attacks. These
scams have incurred financial loss of over 520K US dollars
(lower-bound).
We have released the scam dataset we collected and all the ex-
periment results to the community at:
https://cryptoexchangescam.github.io/ScamDataset/
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
2.1 Cryptocurrency and Exchange
Cryptocurrency is a kind of digital asset that uses cryptography to
ensure its creation security and transaction security. The first and
most well-known cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, was released in 2009,
and till now there are over 2, 500 different kinds of cryptocurren-
cies. With the rise of cryptocurrencies in 2017, people pay more
attention on cryptocurrency exchanges in order to get or trade cryp-
tocurrencies. A cryptocurrency exchange is a marketplace where
users can buy and sell cryptocurrencies. Many of them only offer
trade services among cryptocurrencies while a few offer fiat (e.g.,
US Dollar or Euro) to cryptocurrency transactions. Similar to stock
market, people flood into cryptocurrency exchanges to invest in
order to get the benefit of cryptocurrency price changes. There are
three types of cryptocurrency exchenges: centralized exchanges
(CEX) which is governed by a company or an organisation, decen-
tralized exchanges (DEX) which provide automated process for
peer-to-peer trades, and hybrid exchanges which combine the both
of the above.
2.2 Related Work
2.2.1 Blockchain Scams and Attacks. Blockchain platforms are
always the targets of scams and security attacks. A few studies have
characterized the blockchain scams. Most of them were focused on
detecting the ponzi schemes [12, 13, 16]. Besides, a large number of
studies focused on detecting and analyzing attacks from different
levels, including blockchain consensus [14], smart contract [11], ab-
normal transactions [15, 18], etc. Despite cryptocurrency exchanges
are the key infrastructure of the blockchain ecosystem, however,
the security-related issues, including the scam problem studied in
this work, have not been well-studied yet.
2.2.2 Domain Typosquatting. Typosquatting (URL hijacking) is
the act of registering a domain name very similar to an existing
legitimate domain, which relies on mistakes such as typos made by
Internet users when inputting a website address into a web browser.
These typosquatting domains are often exploited by attackers. Many
research studies were focused on detecting and analyzing domain
typosquatting. Wang et al. [31] proposed a general and widely
adopted approach to generate typosquatting domain names. Szurdi
et al. [27] estimated that 20% of the .com domain registrations are
true typo domains and the number is increasing with the expansion
of the .com domain space. Agten et al. [9] found that even though
95% of the popular domains we investigated are actively targeted
by typosquatting, only few trademark owners protect themselves
against this practice by proactively registering their own typosquat-
ting domains. Besides, a few tools are available to generate possible
squatting domains, including URLCrazy [8], dnstwist [5], etc. In
this study, we identify that a number of the exchange scams are
in the form of typosquatting. Thus, we take advantage of existing
techniques to generate typosquatting domains and further analyze
the scams (see Section 4.1).
2.2.3 Fake Apps/App Clones. A fake app masquerades as the
legitimate one by mimicking the look or functionality. Fake apps
usually have identical app names or package names to the original
ones. There have been a number of studies focusing on this topic.
Wang et al. [30] proposed a clustering approach on app names to
detect potential fake apps. Tang et al. [28] have characterized over
150K fake apps that have same package names or app names with
popular apps. Kywe et al. [21] and Li et al. [22] proposed technique
to detect fake apps based on the external features of apps, e.g., icons,
app names. In this paper, we follow the most traditional method
to identify fake apps, i.e., apps share the same app name or app ID
(package name) but with different authorship (see Section 4.2).
3 STUDY DESIGN
In this paper, we perform a large-scale measurement of cryptocur-
rency exchange scams in the wild. We therefore take advantage
of various sources and approaches to collect a dataset that covers
scams targeting the top cryptocurrency exchanges, in the form of
both domains and mobile apps.
3.1 Target Cryptocurrency Exchange
It is first necessary to compile a list of Cryptocurrency Exchanges,
which may be subject to scam attacks. As the volume of each cryp-
tocurrency exchange fluctuates greatly every day, the ranking of
exchanges is not stable. Thus, we resort to Google to first retrieve
several ranking lists of Cryptocurrency Exchanges, and then merge
them to build a list of 70 popular exchanges, as shown in Table 11.
To cover both domain and mobile apps, we further collected the
official domain names of these exchanges (some exchanges have
more than one domain), and their corresponding Android apps2.
3.2 Research Questions
Our measurement study in this paper is driven by the following
research questions (RQs):
RQ1 Are scam attacks prevalent in the cryptocurrency ex-
changes?Although a number of media reports revealed that
1Due to the ranking fluctuates, we list these exchanges in Table 1 based on the dictio-
nary order of exchange names.
2Note that we only collected their most up-to-date app versions and extract the
corresponding developer signatures, which is feasible for us to identify the fake apps
in the following study
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Table 1: The target exchanges and the corresponding results.
Name Launch Time Official Site #Mal URLs App # Fake Apps
Anxpro Mar-2014 anxpro.com 1 ✓ 0(0)
B2bx Oct-2017 b2bx.exchange 0 ✗ 1(0)
Bcex Aug-2017 bcex.ca 1 ✓ 0(0)
Bgogo May-2018 bgogo.com 5 ✓ 0(0)
Bibox Nov-2017 bibox.com/bibox365.com 11 ✓ 1(1)
Binance Jul-2017 binance.com 320 ✓ 16(9)
Bisq Dec-2014 bisq.network 0 ✓ 0(0)
Bit-Z Jun-2016 bit-z.com 3 ✓ 1(0)
Bitbay Feb-2014 bitbay.net 20 ✓ 4(0)
Bitfinex Oct-2012 bitfinex.com 46 ✓ 8(4)
bitFlyer Jan-2014 bitflyer.com 13 ✓ 0(0)
Bitforex Jun-2018 bitforex.com 7 ✗ 1(0)
Bithumb Jan-2014 bithumb.com 5 ✓ 5(4)
Bitlish Jul-2014 bitlish.com 1 ✓ 0(0)
BitMart Mar-2018 bitmart.com 9 ✓ 0(0)
BitMax Jul-2018 bitmax.io 4 ✓ 0(0)
BitMEX Apr-2014 bitmex.com 68 ✗ 20(8)
Bitpanda Oct-2014 bitpanda.com 44 ✓ 2(1)
Bitso May-2014 bitso.com 7 ✓ 1(0)
Bitstamp Jul-2011 bitstamp.net 13 ✓ 3(1)
Bittrex Feb-2014 bittrex.com 78 ✗ 11(5)
BW.COM Jan-2017 bw.com 0 ✓ 0(0)
CEX.IO Jan-2013 cex.io 1 ✓ 3(0)
Changelly Oct-2015 changelly.com 24 ✓ 6(6)
Cobinhood Dec-2017 cobinhood.com 18 ✓ 4(0)
CoinAll Aug-2018 coinall.com 0 ✓ 0(0)
Coinbase May-2014 coinbase.com 120 ✓ 23(15)
Coinbene Sep-2017 coinbene.com 13 ✓ 0(0)
Coincheck Nov-2014 coincheck.com 31 ✓ 3(3)
Coineal Apr-2018 coineal.com 1 ✓ 0(0)
CoinEx Dec-2017 coinex.com 2 ✓ 0(0)
CoinExchange Mar-2016 coinexchange.io 0 ✗ 12(9)
Coinfloor Mar-2014 coinfloor.co.uk 0 ✗ 0(0)
Coinify Dec-2017 coinify.com 0 ✗ 0(0)
Coinmama Apr-2013 coinmama.com 25 ✗ 7(4)
Coinone Jun-2014 coinone.co.kr 0 ✓ 1(0)
Cryptonex Oct-2017 cryptonex.org 3 ✓ 0(0)
Cryptopia May-2014 cryptopia.co.nz 3 ✗ 23(8)
Deribit Mar-2015 deribit.com 27 ✓ 0(0)
DigiFinex Apr-2018 digifinex.com 20 ✓ 0(0)
Erisx Oct-2018 erisx.com 9 ✗ 0(0)
Etoro Jun-2011 etoro.com 10 ✓ 13(2)
EXX Oct-2017 exx.com 1 ✓ 0(0)
FatBTC May-2014 fatbtc.com 1 ✓ 0(0)
FCoin May-2018 fcoin.com 6 ✓ 1(0)
Gate.io Jan-2013 gate.io 1 ✓ 2(0)
GBX Oct-2017 exchange.gbx.gi 0 ✓ 0(0)
Gemini Oct-2014 gemini.com 10 ✓ 0(0)
HitBTC Dec-2013 hitbtc.com 54 ✓ 16(7)
Huobi Sep-2013 huobi.com/hbg.com 25 ✓ 0(0)
IDAX Dec-2017 idax.pro 1 ✓ 0(0)
itBit Nov-2013 itbit.com 6 ✗ 0(0)
Kraken Jul-2011 kraken.com 35 ✗ 11(2)
KuCoin Aug-2017 kucoin.com/kcs.top 44 ✓ 14(7)
LATOKEN Jul-2017 latoken.com 11 ✗ 0(0)
Lbank Oct-2016 lbank.info 0 ✓ 2(2)
Liquid Mar-2014 liquid.com 0 ✗ 0(0)
Livecoin Mar-2014 livecoin.net 11 ✗ 2(2)
LocalBitcoins Jun-2012 localbitcoins.com 211 ✗ 32(18)
Luno Feb-2017 luno.com 5 ✓ 2(2)
OKEx Jan-2014 okex.com/okcoin.com 21 ✓ 2(2)
OOOBTC Nov-2017 ooobtc.com 1 ✓ 0(0)
Paxful Jul-2015 paxful.com 75 ✓ 13(11)
Poloniex Jan-2014 poloniex.com 45 ✓ 35(30)
ShapeShift Jun-2015 shapeshift.io 23 ✓ 0(0)
Wirex Dec-2014 wirexapp.com 13 ✓ 0(0)
Xapo Mar-2014 xapo.com 2 ✓ 2(2)
xCoins Apr-2016 xcoins.io 0 ✗ 1(1)
Yobit Aug-2014 yobit.net 22 ✗ 19(4)
ZB.com Nov-2017 zb.com/zbg.com 8 ✓ 0(0)
cryptocurrency exchange scam attacks popped up from time
to time, it is still unknown to us to what extent these attacks
exist in the ecosystem, and how prevalent are them. Besides,
it is also interesting to investigate which cryptocurrency
exchanges are their main targets, and how do they perform
the scam attacks. We further divide RQ1 into two sub-RQs,
RQ1.1: what is the presence and trend of scam domains? and
RQ1.2: what is the presence and trend of scam mobile apps?
RQ2 Who are the attackers behind them? To understand such
attacks in a systematic way, we further want to characterize
the real attackers behind them. It is interesting to investigate
whether such scams were performed by a group of identical
hackers.
RQ3 What is the impact of the scams? Although it is known
to us the existence of such scams (e.g., squatting websites
and fake apps), it is not clear to us the impact of them, e.g.,
how many users were tricked and got financial loss.
To answer RQ1, we make effort to collect the existing known
scams and further identify a large number of unknown scams based
on techniques adapted from domain squatting attacks and fake mo-
bile apps. To answer RQ2, we perform the domain relation analysis
based on a set of inherent domain features (e.g., passive DNS, whois,
etc.), and the app relation analysis based on the develoepr signature
and code-level similarity comparison. To answer RQ3, we make
effort to correlate the scams to blockchain addresses, and collect
the transaction information to estimate the number of victims and
the amount of financial losses.
4 MEASUREMENT OF THE SCAMS
In this section, we measure the presence of exchange scams in
the form of both domain scams and app scams. To cover as much
scams as possible, we use a hybrid approach here, by collecting the
existing known scams first and then develop automated approaches
to further identify scams that have not been disclosed to public.
4.1 Detecting the Scam Domains
4.1.1 Collecting Scam Domains from Existing Corpus. There are
somewell-knownwebsites collecting scam cryptocurrency domains
in our community, e.g., etherscamdb.info and cryptoscamdb.org are
two representative ones. Thus, we first write crawlers to collect
the known scam domains, and then filter exchange related ones.
To this end, 657 scam exchange domains were collected using this
approach by the time of our study.
4.1.2 Generating the Squatting Domains. By manually exploring
the collected scam domains, we have identified that a number of
them were distributed using the domain typosquatting techniques.
They are mainly using these domains to create websites looking
exactly similar with the correct one, resulting in the loss of users’
credentials or assets.
Thus, we further explore whether there are more scam domains
that have not been disclosed to public. As domain squatting has
been widely studied in our community and there are many tools
available, we take advantage of dnstwist[5], a widely used tool to
generate typosquatting domains and identify the scam ones [17, 29].
Dnstwist has embedded 13 generation models to explore the pos-
sible squatting domains. Take domain binance.com as an example,
over 2,000 possible squatting domains would be generated using dif-
ferent transformation methods, such as addition (e.g., binancer.com),
bitsquatting (e.g., bijance.com), homoglyph (e.g., binαnce.com), hy-
phenation (e.g., bi-nance.com), insertion (e.g., bibnance.com), omission
(e.g., binace.com), repetition (e.g., binancce.com), replacement (e.g.,
binancw.com), subdomain (e.g., binan.ce.com), transposition (e.g.,
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(1) paxfulservice.com(a phishing domain that targets 
exchange paxful.com).
(2)coinbasegive.com(a trading-scam domain that targets 
exchange coinbase.com).
(3)deriibt.com(a referral fraud domain that targets 
exchange deribit.com).
(4)okexw.com(a gambling domain that targets exchange 
okex.com).
Figure 1: Examples of Scam Domains.
binanec.com), vowel-swap (e.g., binonce.com), various (e.g., binance-
com.com) and dictionary (e.g., my-binance.com,binancepay.com).
In this way, we feed the domains of the 70 studied exchanges to
dnstwist, and we have generated 144,392 squatting candidates in
total. Note that, as some domains have not been registered, thus we
further filter the domains that have no corresponding IP addresses
during our visiting. At last, we have identified 4, 457 valid domains
by the time of our study (2019-09-23).
4.1.3 Labelling the Domains. Note that, not all the squatting
domains deliver themalicious or scam purposes, as some of them are
only used for parking services [10, 25]. Thus, we further seek to label
the suspicious domains and identify the malicious ones. We collect
all the possible information related each domain, including the
WHOIS information, DNS information, autonomous system numbers
and VirusTotal anti-virus engine scan results3. Furthermore, we write
crawler to get the screenshots of these websites, the source code of
webpage, and record the redirect links. Then, we follow the most
widely used approach [26] in our community, to label the domains
in an semi-automated way.
First, as some domains display only blank pages during our vis-
iting, thus we remove such domains (labelled as C1: Registered).
Then, for each domain, we analyze the landing URL (the page that
one URL is finally redirected to), source code and screenshots, by
comparing them with the ones of known parking services and their
corresponding official websites, to determine whether they are us-
ing parking service or redirect users to their referral links (labelled
3VirusTotal (https://www.virustotal.com/) is a widely-used online anti-virus service
that combining over 60 state-of-the-art engines.
asC2: Parked andC5: Referral Fraud). After that, we take advan-
tage of OCR techniques to analyze the content similarity and image
similarity, between these websites and their corresponding official
websites, in order to identify the phishing websites(labelled as C3:
Phishing). We also rely on VirusTotal’s labelling results to classify
if a domain is used for phishing and scamming purposes. For the
domains flagged by VirusTotal, we further manually analyze them
to classify them into phishing (labelled asC3: Phishing) or trading
scam (labelled as C4: Trading Scam). Furthermore, we collect all
the image contents listed on the domains to identify whether they
are used to perform devious behaviors (e.g., adult and gambling)
using Google Cloud Natural Language API and Vision API4 (la-
belled as C6: Adult and Gambling). At last, for the remaining
unclassified domains, we perform manually analysis to see whether
they belong to the aforementioned categories or not. Note that,
some of the generated domains may be false positives, i.e., they are
benign and their names are authentic, which will be flagged during
the manually verification (labelled as C0: False Positive).
In this way, we are able to classify the scam domains into the
following categories:
• C0 False Positive: There are 728 domains (14.30%) belong-
ing to this category, which were flagged during manually
verification. Their names are authentic and they are benign
websites. For example, the domain name https://bidflyer.com/
looks like bitFlyer’s domain, while it is an auction platform
for airlines.
4Google Cloud APIs (https://cloud.google.com/apis/) provide Natural Language API to
help understand the texts and Vision API to help identify explicit images
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• C1 Registered: Although some domains have correspond-
ing resolved IP addresses, while they cannot reached during
our experiments or they just display blank pages. Thus, we
label such domains as ’Registered’. Roughly 23.54% (1,198)
domains belong to this category.
• C2 Parked: The domains using parking services account
for 30.83% of our dataset. People who hold domains usually
use parking services to advertise or sale their domains.
• C3 Phishing: Phishing domains account for 8.35% of our
generated dataset. They often have similar looks with the
official ones, making it easier for users to be tricked into
typing in their account credentials or downloading malware
the domains provide. In our dataset, Binance exchange has
the most number of phishing domains (107 domains).
• C4 Trading Scam: These domains tend to directly take
users’ money or digital assets. Among 249 Trading scam
cases, 232 domains are the Trust-Trading scams. A trust-
trading occurs when a victim gives a scammer money (e.g.,
BTC or ETH), trusting that the scammer will then return
them with high-level interest rate investment or rich pay-
back. Instead, however, the attackers simply take the victim’s
money and leave. Other cases of this category include offer-
ing fake exchange support channel or Ponzi schemes, etc.
• C5 Referral Fraud: The Referral Fraud domains account
for 16.42% of our dataset. This kind of domains often for-
wards users to the official exchanges’ domain while adding
attackers’ affiliate code in order to earn a reward provided
by these exchanges’ referral program.
• C6Adult andGambling:We find 85 domains redirect users
to adult or gambling websites. Although these websites have
almost no relations with crptocurrency exchanges, they cre-
ate these typosquatting domains with the malicious purpose
of attracting users.
In this paper, we regard the last four categories (phishing, trad-
ing scam, referral fraud, adult and gambling) as scam domains in
general, as all of them fulfill either scam or malicious purposes.
Figure 1 shows the four representative examples of scam domains.
4.1.4 Overall Result. At last, we have identified 1,595 scam do-
mains, and 58 exchanges (83%) were targeted by them. Note that
only 657 domains have been reported on existing scam databases,
and over 58.8% of them have not been disclosed to our community.
General Distribution. The distribution of these domains is
shown in Figure 2. Referral Fraud is the most popular category,
representing 52.41% of all the scam domains. Phishing is the second
largest category, targeting 28 exchanges. Besides, we have identified
249 trading scam domains, targeting 21 exchanges.
Target Exchanges Figure 3 shows the distribution of targeted
exchanges, and the relation with the exchanges’ volume5. Binance,
LocalBitcoins, and Coinbase are the exchanges that have the most
number of scam domains. It is interesting to see that, in general,
scam domains mainly target the exchanges with high volume, while
not all popular exchanges have a large number of scam domains.
For example, BitMax has the largest trading volume on 2019-08-01,
while it only has 4 scam domains. The reason might be that, BitMax
5As the trading volume of exchanges change everyday, here we use the volume of
2019-08-01 to represent each exchange.
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Figure 2: The distribution of scam domains.
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becomes popular since mid 2019, and it has released an incentive
plan to attract users6. Before that, it is not as popular as other major
exchanges. Thus, we find only a few scams of it.
The Evolution of ScamDomain.We further analyzed the evo-
lution of scam domains, as shown in Figure 4. We use the creation
date of WHOIS information to represent when a domain was ap-
peared. As expected, the number of scam domains has increased
rapidly after 2017, following the explosive growth of blockchain
techniques. It is surprising to observe that, the first exchange scam
domain was found in 2004-04-08. However, there was no exchange
by the time of 2004. Our manually verification suggests that this
is not a false positive. The domain name is www.etorro.com, which
6https://www.cryptoglobe.com/latest/2019/09/one-exchange-racked-up-50-of-all-
tether-volume-in-august/
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Table 2: Top-5 domains ranked by the most number of en-
ginges on VirusTotal.
Domain Target exchange # enginesreported Category
xn–localitcoins-bh4f.net LocalBitcoins 14 Phishing
paxfuyl.com paxful 11 ReferralFraud
yobit.tilda.ws yobit 10 Trading Scam
binance.eth-win.com Binance 10 Trading Scam
binancepromo-now.online Binance 10 Trading Scam
is verified to be a Referral Fraud domain targeting Etoro exchange.
Thus, we guess that the domain turns to be the referral fraud after
Etoro was founded in 2011), before that it might be a domain with
other purposes.
How many of them are flagged by anti-virus engines? As
shown in Figure 5, it is surprising to see that, over 60% of the
domains in our dataset have not been flagged by any anti-virus
engine on VirusTotal and only 40.56% of the domains are flagged by
at least 1 engine. As for each category, over 90% of ReferralFraud
domains and 90% of Adult and Gambling domains are not detected
by anti-virus engines. Although most of the Trading Scam and
Phishing domains are labelled by at least 1 engines, only very few
of them are labelled by 10 or more engines7. Table 2 shows the
top-5 domains ranked by the most number of flagged engines.
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Figure 5: The distribution of the number of flagged VT en-
gines for our collected scam domains.
Answer to RQ1.1: Our experiment results suggested that the
scam exchange domains are prevalent in the ecosystem. Over
83% (58) of our studied exchanges are targeted by 1,595 scam
domains, and most of them were used for malicious purposes
including phishing, trading scam, referral fraud, adult and gam-
bling. We have identified 938 domains that have not been dis-
closed to our community. Unfortunately, most of the domains
cannot be flagged by existing anti-virus engines on VirusTotal.
4.2 Detecting the Fake Apps
4.2.1 Identifying Fake Apps. To identify fake exchange apps,
we first make efforts to collect all the most up-to-data apps from
7As previous work suggested that some anti-virus engines on ViusTotal may not
always report reliable results, thus they tend to choose a threshold (e.g., 5 or 10).
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Figure 6: Top 10 targeted exchanges of Fake Apps.
the official websites for each exchange, and extract the certificate
signatures from apps8. Then we seek to search all the possible fake
apps from app markets. Note that, as app market such as Google
Play always removes malicious and fake apps from time to time,
it is hard for us to compile a complete list of fake exchange apps.
Here, we resort to Koodous9, a large Android app repository with
over 53 million apps in total by the time of our study, containing
apps from various sources including Google Play. We use crawler to
search the app names and package names in Koodous, and collect
all the related apps with same app names or package names. For
the collected apps, we further analyze their developer signatures
and compare them with the original ones. If found mismatch, we
then regard them as fake apps. Note that, this is the general method
used in our community to identify fake apps.
4.2.2 Overall Result. Wehave collected 2,810 apks fromKoodous,
and 323 of them are fake apps – have same app name/package name
with the official exchange apps but signed by different developer
signatures. The other apps are official apps with different versions
released by the exchanges.
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Figure 7: The volume of exchange vs. the number of fake
apps.
Distribution of Fake apps.These fake apps target 38 exchanges
(54%) in total. Figure 6 shows the top-10 targeted exchanges. Poloniex
8We assume that each developer will use the same signature to sign their apps and
developers’ privacy keys will not be leaked, which is a commonsense adopted by the
research community.
9https://koodous.com/
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Figure 8: The evolution of fake apps.
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Figure 9: # of VirusTotal reported engines when scanning
fake apps.
exchange has 35 fake apps in total (with 45 scam domains as shown
in Figure 2). For the top-10 targets of fake apps, 7 of them are the
same with that of scam domains. We further investigate whether
the popular exchanges would receive more fake apps. As shown
in Figure 7, the general trend is similar with that of scam domains,
i.e., fake apps usually target popular exchanges with large trading
volume. But there are exceptional cases too. For example, BitMax
has no corresponding fake apps in our study, while it has only 4
scam domains. As aforementioned, the reason might be that BitMax
becomes popular since mid 2019 due to its incentive mechanism
introduced, and it has not received much attentions from attackers
by the time of our study.
The Evolution of ScamApps.We refer to the first seen time on
VirusTotal to show the evolution of scam apps, and the distribution
is shown in Figure 8. The first fake exchange app in our dataset
appeared on Nov 16th 2013, targeting at Etoro exchange with a
referral link. In our dataset, fake apps began to appear in the second
half of 2013 and reached its peak of 85 in the first half of 2018.
Howmany of them are flagged by anti-virus engines?We
further analyze howmany of the fake apps are flagged by anti-virus
engines. As shown in Figure 9, over 52.6% (170) of them are flagged
at least one engine, and 33 apps are flagged by over 10 engines.
Table 3 shows top-5 of them.
4.2.3 Classification of Fake apps. To classify the fake apps, we
use two complementary approaches. For the 170 apps that were
Table 3: Top-5 fake apps ranked by the number of flagged
engines on VirusTotal.
App name Targetexchange md5
# engines
reported
Bitcoin allet - Coinbase Coinbase d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e 32
Binance Secured Binance 487ad3a4d18c8b2274bff5916c67bee9 31
Bithumb update Bithumb e7f634c53f0f0ddd48503d4efb661824 29
Bitcoin allet - Coinbase Coinbase 76c691abacd276642f11041ec2f78355 29
Coinbase Coinbase b9f6d2c42e961330dfed437f068a6bb1 29
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Figure 10: The distribution of malware types.
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Figure 11: The distribution of malware families.
flagged by VirusTotal, we use Euphony [19], a widely-used tool to
analyze the scanned results to label a malware type and malware
family for each of them. For the remaining 153 apps that were not
flagged by VirusTotal, we either install them on smartphones or de-
compile them using static analysis tools for manually examination.
Malware Type andMalware FamilyDistribution.As shown
in Figure 10, for the 170 flagged fake apps, roughly 50% of them are
labelled as grayware by VirusTotal. Over 40% of them are flagged
as Trojan, and roughly 4% of them are labelled as adware. This
result suggests that these fake apps may expose great security threats
to users. To be specific, we use Euphony to generate a malware
family label for each of them, and Figure 11 shows the malware
family distribution. As expected, family fakeapp ranks the first,
with 23 apps labelled. The labels of the remaining apps vary greatly,
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including adware families like inmobi, mobidash, and malicious
categories like smsmspy and slocker. Note that, there are 102 apps
that Euphony cannot give them a family label based on the flagged
results of engines. This result also suggests that existing anti-virus
engines cannot classify these fake apps accurately.
Manually Inspection. For the remaining 153 fake apps, we
found that all of them are referral apps with advertisements. Similar
with referral fraud domains, most of the referral apps use webview
to connect to their referral links, intending to attract new users.
In general, they will also embed some ad libraries to increase the
income.
Examples. Figure 12 shows examples of the fake apps we iden-
tified. Figure 12(1) shows a phishing app10 that targets Poloniex. It
fabricates a fake login screen and tricks users into typing in their
Poloniex accounts. After that, it will continue to display a fake 2FA
verification screen and ask for full email access to further steal
users’ email accounts. Once success, attackers will get full access
to users’ Poloniex accounts and steal their money in a silent way.
Figure 12(2) is a Coinbase adware11 sample. It was repackaged from
official Coinbase app, and embedded with aggressive ad libraries.
During run-time, it requires users to install recommended apps,
otherwise users cannot access to the main functionality of the app.
However, most of the recommended apps are considered to be
malicious. Furthermore, the app will push mobile ads during its
running at background, which could lead to the unintentionally
clicking of the advertisement. Figure 12(3) is a referral app12 that
targets Binance. It simply implements a webview and connects to
the referral link https://www.binance.com/?ref=20270961. Attackers
will benefit from users who register from this links. The benefit is
usually a portion of commission fee, depending on the referral rules
of different exchanges13. Figure 12(4) is a code snippet of a Bithumb
trojan app14. As highlighted in the decompiled code, it will collect
users’ text messages, contracts, and call logs secretly, and then up-
load them to http://bithumbinback.pro/, which was the attacker’s
private server. Moreover, it monitors the device’s incoming calls
and messages at background.
Answer to RQ1.2: Fake exchange apps are also prevalent in
the ecosystem. Over 38 exchanges are targeted by 323 fake apps.
A number of them show malicious behaviors and pose great
security threats to mobile users.
5 UNDERSTANDING THE ATTACKERS
Our previous exploration suggests that exchange scams are preva-
lent in the ecosystem. In this section, we further investigate the
relationship between these scams, in order to understand the at-
tackers behind them. We first correlate the scam domains based
on the information we collected, then we group fake apps based
on code similarity and developer signatures. At last, we further
identify the relationship between scam domains and fake apps.
10SHA256:559f70db9f6e6741b59bdb2ad99f8ac53f5915e6ef3cab33522ce27cd9ccadb9
11SHA256:91b523bdc7ffc7647b29d479b0e553f7d14f26d768960853eb8e9bb5d4493685
12SHA256:9efe538f464632b355086e06e6f07c785ccde94b5561647bd60628c3b2a261e7
13https://www.binance.com/en/activity/referral
14SHA256:e50e1dacbe6dcd8653c47c767d664860907e53adc55af5da056282bfabc898ca
(1)A Poloniex phishing app
(2)A Coinbase adware app 
(4)A Bithumb trojan app
(3)A Binance referral app
Figure 12: Examples of Identified Fake Apps.
5.1 The Relation of the Scam Domains
5.1.1 Approach. We use a three-phase clustering approach to
characterize their relationship, as shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 13: A Three-phase Domain Clustering.
IP clustering. For each scam domain, we first resort to urlscan15
to collect all the related IP addresses by searching its history resolve
IPs (Passive DNS). We have collected 1, 348 unique IP addresses
that related to the 1, 534 scam domains. Note that one domains may
correspond to multiple IP addresses, and several domains may share
the same IP addresses. In Section 4.1.3, we collected the domains that
uses parking services and their IPs. We further remove IPs related
to parking service in case they affect the cluster result. Then we
group the domains based on IP addresses. During grouping, we also
find other IPs related to parking services or domain hosting services
due to their uncommon cluster sizes, and we remove them too. At
last, we have remained 1, 215 IP addresses that we believe were
used for malicious purposes. After this step, we have 76 clusters in
total, with 580 domains in the clusters. Note that, the remaining
1015 domains are isolated in this step.
Whois Clustering.Whois information usually contains some
personal data of the domain holders, which may help identify the
domain groups held by each attacker[20, 26]. Only 266 domains
(16.7%) in our datasets have corresponding valid Whois informa-
tion16. Among 266 domains, there are 51 uniqueWhois information
and 11 of them are shared by 226 domains. This results in 6 new
clusters, and 2 clusters in step 1 are combined. Therefore, after this
step, we further cluster the domains to 81 clusters (including 644
domains).
Blockchain Address Clustering. As some identified domains
are used for trading scams, and they have embedded the scam
blockchain addresses in the corresponding webpages. Thus we
further analyzed the crawled HTML webpage, and use regular ex-
pressions and checksum to identify blockchain addresses. Table 4
shows examples of regular expressions we used to identify Bit-
coin and Ethereum addresses, respectively. We have identified 182
blockchain addresses in total, acrossing 6 kinds of Cryptocurrencies,
15https://urlscan.io/
16The Whois information of some domains is replaced with the words like ’GDPR
Masked’ due to privacy consideration, thus we only consider Whois information that
contains a valid distinguishable registrant name.
Table 4: Examples of regular expressions we use to identify
blockchain addresses.
Cryptocurrencies Regular expression
Bitcoin (bc1|[13])[a-zA-HJ-NP-Z0-9]{25,39}
Ethereum 0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40}
Table 5: A summary of blockchain addresses we got from
scam domains.
Blockchain # targetexchanges Target exchanges # domains # addr
Ethereum 19 Binance,Bibox,OKEx,Cobinhood,Coinbase,BitMEX,... 138 111
Bitcoin 7 Binance,Coinbase,Huobi,Kraken,OKEx,BitMEX,Yobit 85 66
XRP 2 Binance,Kucoin 5 2
Tron 2 Poloniex,Kucoin 5 1
NEO 2 Poloniex,Kucoin 3 1
Binance Coin 1 Binance 1 1
including Ethereum, Bitcoin, XRP, Tron, NEO and Binance Coin,
as shown in Table 5. More specifically, we have 66 Bitcoin scam
addresses and 111 Ethereum scam addresses, Then, we group the
domains based on these addresses, and achive the final clustering
results.
5.1.2 Results. At last, we have obtained 94 clusters, with 699
domains (43.8%) in total. Note that there are 896 isolated domains.
The distribution of cluster size is shown in Figure 14.We can observe
that most of the clusters are small clusters with size 2 or 3, and
there are only 18 clusters with a size larger than 5. Table 6 lists the
top-15 clusters, which we have assigned each cluster a family name.
This result suggests that: (1) some attackers have the tendency to
created a large number of scam domains. For example, the largest
family in our dataset have created 254 scam domains, targeting 11
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Figure 14: The distribution of cluster size.
different exchanges; (2) attackers tend to use the same method to
create the scam domains, i.e., the scam category remains the same
for most clusters. The reason might be that it is easier for them to
reuse one method in creating multiple scam domains.
5.2 The Relation of the Fake Apps
5.2.1 Approach. We group fake apps based on both developer
signatures and code similarity.
Clustering based on developer signatures. Android system
uses developer certificates to identify the authorship of apps. In
our dataset, we have extracted 206 unique developer signatures in
total. Note that, some fake apps may use the common signatures
that widely known in our community. For example, Android frame-
work has provided four common keys. Thus, we further analyze
these signatures and remove a common Android framework sig-
nature ’61ed377e85d386a8dfee6b864bd85b0bfaa5af81’ (related to 6
exchanges and 9 fake apps). We thus have 205 unique developer
signatures in total.
Clustering based on code similarity. Previouswork suggested
that malicious developers always reuse the code to generated apps.
Thus, we further measure the code-level similarity of these fake
apps. Here, we take advantage of SimiDroid [23], a tool that provides
comprehensive pairwise comparison to understand the similarity
among apps.We perform pair-wise comparison to calculate method-
level similarity of all the apps we collected.Apps with similarity
higher than 80%17 will be classified into a same cluster.
5.2.2 Results. For the signature-level clustering, we observe
that 60 signatures were reused by fake apps, with 169 apps in total.
The other remaining 145 signatures only have one corresponding
app each18. Table 7 shows the result. Fake apps in signature-level
clusters account for over 52% of all the fake apps we identified. As
to the code-level clustering, we have clustered 34 groups, including
270 fake apps (83.6%), with only 53 isolated apps. Table 8 shows the
top-5 code similarity clustering groups.
Results show that both developer signatures and code similarity
can help identify attacker groups. We further study the relations
of the signature-same clusters and code-similar clusters. Based on
the code similarity clusters, we combine the clusters that contain
same signatures and then add signature clusters that are not in the
similarity clusters. At last, we combine 9 similarity clusters into 3
clusters and add two signature clusters. We finally have grouped
17The threshold is selected empirically based on previous studies [24].
18There are also 9 fake apps signed by the Android framework common signature.
30 app clusters, with 275 apps (85.1%) in total (with only 48 isolated
apps).
We further sampled apps from each cluster for manually inspec-
tion, and we have the following observations. First, fake apps signed
by the same certificate are usually with high code similarity, indi-
cating that they share the similar malicious behaviors and purposes.
Second, similar to the scam domains, to reduce development cost,
quite a few attackers prefer to use easy-to-use visual programming
platforms like App Inventor19 or AppsGeyser(https://appsgeyser.com/)
to develop their forged apps with a specific template.
5.3 The Tie between Scam Domains and Apps
To investigate the tie between scam domains and fake apps, we fur-
ther analyzed the connected URLs and domains of fake apps, to see
whether they are overlapped with the scam domains we identified.
Therefore, we extract urls from the fake apps using Apkatshu20,
a popular tool for extracting urls, emails, and IP addresses from
apk files. We seek to investigate whether we could find some clues
to link the scam domains and apps. However, from the data we
collected, we can only find 1 phishing url (xn–polonix-y8a.com)
targeting at Poloniex. This result suggested that, there is no clear ev-
idence to link scam domains and the fake apps. The reason might be
that, fake apps usually use the app name and user interface to infect
unsuspicious users. As long as users have installed the fake apps,
the malicious behaviors can be performed in either foreground (e.g.,
using the fake UIs) or background (e.g., stealthy behaviors), without
the need of further using squatting domains to cheat users.
Answer to RQ2: Our experiment results suggested that a num-
ber of the scams are controlled in groups, i.e., 43.8% of the scam
domains and 85.1% of fake apps could be clustered into groups.
This observation could help us identify and track the new scams
in the future. For example, new domains that related to existing
scam IP addresses and blockchain addresses are high suspicious
to bemalicious. The apps released by the known scam signatures
should also be paid special attention to.
6 CHARACTERIZING THE IMPACTS
In this section, we measure the impacts of cryptocurrency exchange
scams from two ways. First, we trace the money flow of scam
addresses, in order to quantifying the scale of the scams, i.e., the
number of victims and the amount of financial loss. Second, we
measure the presence of fake apps on major app markets, to see
howmany of them have penetrated to popular app markets to infect
unsuspicious users.
6.1 Money flow of scam addresses
As aforementioned in Section 5.1.1, we extract 182 unique wallet
addresses contained in the trading scam websites. Thus, we further
analyze the transaction information related to these addresses to
estimate the impact the scams. Note that, the financial loss we esti-
mated here is a lower-bound of the whole ecosystem, considering
that there are many scam domains that we are not able to directly
investigate their impacts here.
19https://appinventor.mit.edu/
20https://github.com/0xPwny/Apkatshu
10
Table 6: Top-15 clusters ranked by the number of scam domains. Note that we have assigned a family name for each cluster
by randomly picking one scam domain name.
Family # urls # exchanges Target exchanges Category Shared IPs Shared Whois Shared addresses
olcalbitcoins.com 254 11 Binance,Livecoin,Wirex,Bitbay,LocalBitcoins,... Referral Fraud 136.243.255.0/24 Vitalii Vselenskiy
coinchecl.com 42 8 Poloniex,Binance,CoinCheck,Kraken,HitBTC,... Referral Fraud xu shuaiwei
kralkem.com 28 7 Poloniex,Binance,Bittrex,Kraken,KuCoin,... Phishing 185.110.132.214
coinbasegift.com 22 3 Coinbase,Binance,Kraken Trading Scam
198.187.29.252,
199.33.112.226,
69.77.162.51,...
1FZWiRH5zSwsaFY5gUFXVGML6NHsADngRp,
19R9MWW88rZwivGWvvz15Ey9G7mpgJYesB,
1CdWQJMiQF1uYbwKc7fb5VBb9JBrhykcNf
bitma.io 20 2 BitMEX,BitMax Referral Fraud 46.166.184.106,185.206.180.119 Sun Wukong
virexapp.com 15 5 Wirex,BitMEX,Bitfinex,Kraken,HitBTC Referral Fraud,Scam 77.78.104.3
bitbai.net 15 3 Yobit,Bitbay,Bitforex Referral Fraud 212.91.7.33,185.253.212.22
deribiy.com 14 2 Huobi,Deribit Referral Fraud 185.182.56.12
bitpannda.com 12 2 Bitpanda,Coinmama Referral Fraud 78.109.174.110
yobitr.net 11 5 Yobit,Binance,Kraken,Hitbtc,Bittrex Phishing 185.110.132.216 Sergei Nesmiyanov
kueoin.com 9 5 Poloniex,BitMEX,Bitfinex,KuCoin,Bittrex Phishing 5.45.65.239
paxfulverify.com 9 3 Yobit,LocalBitcoins,Paxful Phishing 204.93.160.0/19,198.38.82.0/24,...
binance-presents.fund 7 1 Binance Trading Scam 162.144.100.203 1Mn386ue8o3mW9866octLNP8HFqcYsphJC,0x11775A106157a283873A81E8Ec58394b8d568E06
loginviet-binance.com 6 1 Binance Phishing 198.187.29.106,198.54.116.199,... Taraku Apostrof
giveaway-coinbase.top 6 1 Coinbase Trading Scam 181.215.237.183 0xDF50C2DA0a52f2a3a231eD38fA1B79Ad97ab9563,0xfb5e36B888bc15528b6Bd42fe0B1b2aF62693eB9
Table 7: Top-10 fake app clusters (signature-level).
Develeper signature(SHA1) Target exchanges # apps
2CB7E9064D1EC3852191B45F3645A02EF55105B9 Kraken,Bitstamp,Cryptopia,HitBTC 4
21064B6D32EB94D49143FE23F06BD222C116B348 Paxful,Coinmama,Bitfinex 3
7CD76D9FEA4736AEFF636AD02512FFE625702FC6 Cryptopia,Poloniex,Bittrex 3
86DA54FDAD362FC78354C987E4337F762D37B702 Bitfinex,Coinmama,Bitstamp 3
E99A56A0F329F243CC2759317F07E94CDF9ACFA8 Cryptopia,Poloniex,Bittrex 3
7B927F47E2F99722846F9706E3B1CAD129E17D90 Cryptopia,Bittrex 5
AF49696504D84B6BD15E3B505EC79049F45DCC73 Bitfinex,Bitstamp 3
8DDD7A5D446A3FEAE270DA5BBC6A14186CD4843E CoinExchange,LocalBitcoins 2
7238E7D72F225EBCD660B0932E47B3197BCE1EB7 LocalBitcoins,Poloniex 2
F16B1CD5DA076CEEEE8BB1523B25B63EC6FAA171 CoinExchange 9
Table 8: Top-5 code similarity clusters which have most
apps.
an app’s SHA256 in fake app families
# of apps in
same family
(# of apps
reported by
VirusTotal)
# of
Target
exchanges
Target exchanges Reported malware types
96348ed94d796d7c0f3459560ca499d-
adfb852c678ecc5ba3d3dfac0dcf261d3 86(71) 18
Bibox,Binance,BitMEX,
bitstamp,Bittrex,... Gray,Trojan
6cb9ab55b6d9dcc85c585546408de196-
2391a49a66ec2afae39b208d29dc9d4a 33(11) 15
b2bx,Binance,bitfinex,
BitMEX,bitso,... Adware,Trojan
818c1a91dd50494adb01748da9f7c8b2-
2a5464fb971e3c6085e977516705057d 16(12) 9
Binance,bitfinex,BitMEX,
bitstamp,Bittrex,...
Repmalware,Riskware,
Trojan
7f5dab9450ba1d7ae6da0747b24ab4c9-
88cb09edecd34277c3b391349f6ca1a1 15(3) 7
Binance,bitforex,cryptopia,
etoro,hitbtc,...
Adware,Gray,
Repmalware
82d8edcf60fd265114280ba2824f34d2-
9d86066be006275b4d8fa1a69c4db803 10(0) 6
Bittrex,cryptopia,hitbtc,
Kraken,Poloniex,yobit
6.1.1 Overall Result. We further retrieved all the transaction
data related to these addresses. There are 1, 713 income transactions
taken place and these scam address received a total number of 28.84
BTC, 1625.29 ETH, and other tokens, which is equivalent to roughly
over 520K US dollars21.
Distribution. We analyze the distribution of BTC and ETH
addresses’ incoming transactions, as shown in Figure 15. For the
amount of money loss, over 41.8% of the transactions are over 100
US Dollars. The largest transaction record took place on 2018-11-
22 and the scam address 1MpLjpT44A5yyRbtGG61rtpgwxdJB3onsB
received about 15K dollars in total.
As to the transaction time, the first victim was deceived 0.99
Ethereum (167.18$) on Sept 16th 2017 on the cobinhood.io whose
target is Cobinhood shortly after the exchange’s ICO launch. It is
interesting to observe that, ETH is popular before 2019, while BTC
turns to be more prevalent after July of 2019.
The most profitable addresses. On average, each scam ad-
dress has received 9 transactions.While some addresses are more ac-
tive thanwe expected, e.g., 0x40949225c4a1745a9946f6aaf763241c082c-
b9ac has received over 474 transactions. We further analyzed the
amount of incoming transactions for BTC and ETH addresses, and
the distribution is shown in Figure 16. On average, each address has
received 2941.05 Dollars. Roughly 75% of the BTC addresses have
received less than 918.58 US Dollar equivalent tokens, and 80.04% of
ETH addresses have received less than 167.42 US Dollar equivalent
tokens. Table 9 lists the top-5 profitable addresses. The largest one
has received roughly 500 ETH, which is roughly equivalent to 83K
US Dollars.
Scam Families.We further analyze the scam families we iden-
tified in Section 5.1.2. Among the 36 families that have at least one
address, 35 of them are trading scams and the remaining one is a
phishing family. They have 68 addresses in total, while the other
21Note that, this amount of money is calculated based on BTC and ETH’s price at
2020-01-21(BTC:8625.16$, ETH:167.25$) and the same below
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Table 9: Top-5 profitable addresses.
Target
exchange Scam domain Scam address
# total
incoming
transactions
Total received Currentvalue($)
Binance binancefree2018.droppages.com 0x40949225c4a1745a9946F6AAf763241c082cb9ac 474 497.39 ETH 83192.66
shapeshift shapishift.io,xn–hapeshit-ez9c2y.com 0x3853ba76ec6ae97818e2d0e0839c9eda6c396690 140 309.13 ETH 51702.10
Coinbase coinbase-airdrop.top,coinbase-btc.xyz 1MpLjpT44A5yyRbtGG61rtpgwxdJB3onsB 28 4.93 BTC 42537.83
Binance dropbinance.com,giftbinance.com 1CdWQJMiQF1uYbwKc7fb5VBb9JBrhykcNf 13 4.43 BTC 38232.70
Binance binance.claims 13XzbaQV6k21yfbS5WDkzwSPkAxQ1AsbQ3 14 1.96 BTC 16950.98
Table 10: Top-5 profitable families.
Target
exchanges Family # domains # addresses Addresses
# total
incoming
transactions
Total received Currentvalue($)
Binance,
Coinbase,
Kraken
coinbasegift.com 22 18
1FZWiRH5zSwsaFY5gUFXVGML6NHsADngRp,
19R9MWW88rZwivGWvvz15Ey9G7mpgJYesB,
1CdWQJMiQF1uYbwKc7fb5VBb9JBrhykcNf,...
65 8.25 BTC 71128.11
Coinbase coinbase-btc.xyz 2 1 1MpLjpT44A5yyRbtGG61rtpgwxdJB3onsB 28 4.93 BTC 42537.83
Binance binance.updog.co 4 2 0x76bb5b6177096b337c79F2f948Aa08b0db5f5211,13XzbaQV6k21yfbS5WDkzwSPkAxQ1AsbQ3 56
35.79 ETH,
1.97 BTC 23028.14
Bithumb,
Huobi huobiglobal.ltd 3 1 0xe2e4B53A1324F5a7368724eA73e532c626517f19 107 60.48 ETH 10411.29
Binance binance-presents.fund 7 4 0x11775A106157a283873A81E8Ec58394b8d568E06,1Mn386ue8o3mW9866octLNP8HFqcYsphJC,... 29
20.70 ETH,
0.62 BTC 8794.36
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Figure 15: The scatter diagram of two major cryptocurren-
cies’ 1,659 transactions.
114 addresses are isolated. Note that, 25 families (69.4% of the fami-
lies that have blockchain addresses) have only one corresponding
blockchain address. The top 5 profitable families are listed in Ta-
ble 10. The family ’coinbasegift.com’ is most profitable, and it has
received over 70, 000 equivalent US dollars in BTC.
6.1.2 Money Flow. We further attempt to identify the relations
between scam addresses by sorting out the money flows. We first
label the addresses in the money flow into three categories: 1)
the scam addresses, the addresses that we extracted from the scam
websites. Note that not all the addresses we found have transactions
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Figure 16: The distribution of incoming transactions for
each scam address.
records, thus we remove the silent scam addresses during themoney
flow analysis. 2) the victim addresses, which have ever transferred
money to the scam addresses and did not receive money from scam
addresses; 3) the fund transfer addresses, which were used to transfer
money originated from the scam addresses. Note that BTC’s change
addresses[3] are also a part of money flow, we consider them as
fund transfer addresses. Figure 17 shows the money flow of two
major cryptocurrencies, BTC and ETH, respectively.
Scamanalysis.There are 1,320 victim addresses (470 in BTC and
850 in ETH) and 132 scam addresses (53 in BTC and 79 in ETH). In
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1MpLjp...
13Xzba...
1EZyRr...
1CdWQJ...
1NNF5B...
bc1qg0...
bc1qmv...
bc1qfw...
Victim address
Scam address
Fund transfer address
(a) BTC addresses’ fund transfer flow.
0x409492...
0x3853ba...
0xe2e4b5...
0xff8e6a...
0x98c29a...
0x03b70d...
0x8b03bb...
0x9dd648...
0xcc0ca0...
Victim address
Scam address
Fund transfer address
(b) ETH addresses’ fund transfer flow.
Figure 17: Fund transfer diagram of two major cryptocurrencies.
victim addresses, we find many of them have transferred money to
multiple scam addresses. For example, the address 0xfbb1b73c4f0bda-
4f67dca266ce6ef42f520fbb98 transferred money to 10 scam addresses
with 68 transactions.
On average, each BTC scam address is related to 9 victim ad-
dresses while each ETH scam address links to about 11, which may
suggests that ETH-based scams have a slightly higher success rate.
Fund transfer analysis. There are 518 fund transfer addresses
(165 in BTC and 353 in ETH), which are far more than the scam
addresses. We further studied their relations. We found 28 addresses
share 13 fund transfer addresses. Table 11 shows the top-5 of them.
It is interesting to see that scam family coinbasegift.com accounts
for most of the top shared fund transfer addresses. Considering
that this family also has mutiple scam addresses and transactions
among scam addresses22, this team of attackers is likely to carry
out a careful plan to avoid tracking and we found only the tip of
the iceberg. Besides, we found most of the fund transfer addresses
have transferred all the tokens they received, suggesting that most
of the attackers have transfer money through a chain of addresses.
To better cover their tracks, attackers may further use the mixing
service [4] to achieve the purpose of money laundering.
6.2 Scams in Major App Markets
Aswe have identified over 300 fake apps, we further analyzewhether
these apps have penetrated into major app markets.
Although we crawled fake apps from Koodous, it does not con-
tain app source information. Thus we resort to Janus23 and Andro-
zoo24, two major app repositories to track fake apps’ evidence in
2212u54UVjvwVmzxNBBjTHtC6dgsVeZdr6RR to bc1qerc6yxzre8xrcdfjx4zkgprafde30lr89vpd5s
and bc1qerc6yxzre8xrcdfjx4zkgprafde30lr89vpd5s to
bc1qmjwhdlz2wvdfrpmrgeydkej5eyv9djjqvsp3lz
23https://appscan.io
24https://androzoo.uni.lu/
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Figure 18: The app market distribution of fake apps.
app markets. Among the 323 fake apps, over 66 (20.4%) of them have
been found in major app markets, as shown in Figure 18. Obviously,
the official market – Google Play, is the first target, with 60 fake
apps in total. Other third-party app markets, have hosted one or
more fake apps. Note that, as we cannot get the download informa-
tion of these fake apps25, we are not able to estimate the overall
number of the victims here. Nevertheless, this result suggests that,
existing app security check mechanisms deployed on app markets
are not able to identify these fake apps effectively, which may affect
many unsuspicious users.
25Most of them were removed from app markets
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Table 11: The top-5 fund transfer addresses ordered by the number of shared scam addresses.
Scam addresses Scam family Fund transfer address
# related
scam
addresses
# of related
transactions
Total
received($)
13tsX2zBiPz3P2nt5HgyFKxXTQFWRqXEuj,
1FGZE75bUCHkoEcaoQLRzBuPYB9NA8XRCQ,
1FZWiRH5zSwsaFY5gUFXVGML6NHsADngRp
2 isolated ,
1 in coinbasegift.com bc1qg09hzxsprzhh3fqdhcf6qtg9kcvcvwrp6nuyly 3 3 10162.78
1CdWQJMiQF1uYbwKc7fb5VBb9JBrhykcNf,
1Lkakee2QGSQ92uNBUCUD1LaL4RKQTobLG,
1BdencTWBaDrxpVBK7PPDtb9cot5Ns8D1T
coinbasegift.com bc1qfw3660gw5xv0t9p594hlq2xkmlkz0gmzley003 3 3 5458.23
0x1363077895b20ae90f80794ce4e575559517d033,
0x915c95415d3449212fd0991ccf5eb42864118ec9 2 isolated 0x8b03bbe38069a34d1ab6db2f545f6cb8cd2d6a1e 2 4 11481.87
0x2784574e2405a7d3be1259b5f00412ae652018f4,
0x3e9163816b073c2ce425c99e68ba8ae7caaec067
1 isolated,
1 in binanceth.net 0x9dd648a58cb8d2b5fbf937b863c627ba747dbf12 2 2 5763.00
1NuZ4rxsQPU4izgtkScs793Uxx2c6ADRQo,
16wd9B1LiXmTNf9hxQyb3Q9fbVHzP3NvSV
1 in coinbasegift.com,
1 in win-binance.com bc1qmvpmfglf9wk4wchucjp7gdhk7gv3wny4vm7z37 2 2 3704.43
Answer to RQ3: Our experiment results suggested that there
are about 1700 victims been deceived, with the amount scammed
up to 520k dollars in our dataset. And although attackers’ groups
can be identified, they used multiple fund transfer addresses and
mixing services to hide their tracks. On the other side, attackers
have the ability to bypass the security check of the app markets
and distribute their fake apps to markets, which exposes great
threat to the community.
7 IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
7.1 Implications
Our observations are of key importance to stakeholders in the
blockchain community. First, considering the large number of scam
domains, fake apps, and blockchain addresses we discovered, the
governance of the ecosystem needs to be improved. Second, con-
sidering most of the cryptocurrency exchanges are suffering from
a growing number of scam attacks, our community should apply
detection methods like we used in this paper to identify such scams
and prevent users from being cheated by them. A growing and
up-to-date scam database is also needed. Third, as we observed in
this paper, many scams have strong relations and we could classify
them into clusters. This observation could guide us to identify new
scams and raise alarms when new related domains found.
7.2 Limitations
Our study carries some limitations. In several cases, First, the meth-
ods and techniques we used in this paper are old-fashioned, i.e.,
typosquatting generation and fake app detection, and we also rely
on some manually efforts in the study. Nevertheless, we have iden-
tify a number of scams and most of them have not been revealed to
the community. Some advanced techniques (e.g., machine learning
techniques) could be used to identify and classify the scams. Second,
in this paper, we are only focused on the exchange scams. However,
a number of scams may target cryptocurrency wallets and tokens.
Thus, a promising future research direction is to study the scams
in the other parts of the blockchain ecosystem. Third, due to the
limitation of dataset, we did not study the distribution channels of
the scams, i.e., how do they get to users. The future direction might
be investigating the advertisements of scams in social networking
platforms (e.g., Facebook and Twitter).
8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we present the first systematic study of cryptocur-
rency exchange scams. We have created a dataset of over 1,500 scam
domains and over 300 fake apps, and shared it to the community to
boost future related research. We characterized the types and be-
haviors of scam domains and apps, and revealed that a majority of
the scams were controlled by a small group of attackers. We further
identified 183 blockchain addresses related to such attackers, and
analyzed impacts of them. Our observations are of key importance
to stakeholders in the blockchain community, and demonstrate the
urgency to identify and prevent blockchain scams.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported by the National Key Research and Devel-
opment Program of China (No. 2018YFB0803603) and the National
Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61702045).
REFERENCES
[1] Group-IB: 14 cyber attacks on crypto exchanges resulted in a loss
of $882 million, 2018. http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/77213/hacking/
cyber-attacks-crypto-exchanges.html.
[2] Binance Security Breach Update, 2019. https://www.binance.com/en/support/
articles/360028031711.
[3] Change, 2019. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Change.
[4] Cryptocurrency mixing service, 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Cryptocurrency_tumbler.
[5] Domain name permutation engine for detecting typo squatting, phishing and
corporate espionage, 2019. https://github.com/elceef/dnstwist.
[6] French Crypto Exchange Coinhouse Suffers Phishing Attack, User Names
and Emails Accessed, 2019. https://www.cryptoglobe.com/latest/2019/09/
french-crypto-exchange-coinhouse-suffers-phishing-attack-user-names-and-\
emails-compromised/.
[7] List of cryptocurrencies, 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_
cryptocurrencies.
[8] URLCrazy, 2019. https://github.com/urbanadventurer/urlcrazy.
[9] P. Agten, W. Joosen, F. Piessens, and N. Nikiforakis. Seven months’ worth of
mistakes: A longitudinal study of typosquatting abuse. In Proceedings of the
22nd Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2015). Internet
Society, 2015.
[10] S. Alrwais, K. Yuan, E. Alowaisheq, Z. Li, and X. Wang. Understanding the
dark side of domain parking. In 23rd {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX}
Security 14), pages 207–222, 2014.
14
[11] N. Atzei, M. Bartoletti, and T. Cimoli. A survey of attacks on ethereum smart
contracts (sok). In International conference on principles of security and trust,
pages 164–186. Springer, 2017.
[12] M. Bartoletti, S. Carta, T. Cimoli, and R. Saia. Dissecting ponzi schemes on
ethereum: identification, analysis, and impact. Future Generation Computer
Systems, 102:259–277, 2020.
[13] M. Bartoletti, B. Pes, and S. Serusi. Data mining for detecting bitcoin ponzi
schemes. In 2018 Crypto Valley Conference on Blockchain Technology (CVCBT),
pages 75–84. IEEE, 2018.
[14] G. Bissias, B. N. Levine, A. P. Ozisik, and G. Andresen. An analysis of attacks on
blockchain consensus. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.07985, 2016.
[15] T. Chen, Y. Zhu, Z. Li, J. Chen, X. Li, X. Luo, X. Lin, and X. Zhange. Understanding
ethereum via graph analysis. In IEEE INFOCOM 2018-IEEE Conference on Computer
Communications, pages 1484–1492. IEEE, 2018.
[16] W. Chen, Z. Zheng, J. Cui, E. Ngai, P. Zheng, and Y. Zhou. Detecting ponzi
schemes on ethereum: Towards healthier blockchain technology. In Proceedings
of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference, pages 1409–1418, 2018.
[17] T. Dam, L. D. Klausner, D. Buhov, and S. Schrittwieser. Large-scale analysis
of pop-up scam on typosquatting urls. In Proceedings of the 14th International
Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, pages 1–9, 2019.
[18] Y. Huang, H. Wang, L. Wu, G. Tyson, X. Luo, R. Zhang, X. Liu, G. Huang, and
X. Jiang. Characterizing eosio blockchain. arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.05369, 2020.
[19] M. Hurier, G. Suarez-Tangil, S. K. Dash, T. F. Bissyandé, Y. Le Traon, J. Klein, and
L. Cavallaro. Euphony: Harmonious unification of cacophonous anti-virus vendor
labels for android malware. In 2017 IEEE/ACM 14th International Conference on
Mining Software Repositories (MSR), pages 425–435. IEEE, 2017.
[20] M. T. Khan, X. Huo, Z. Li, and C. Kanich. Every second counts: Quantifying the
negative externalities of cybercrime via typosquatting. In 2015 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, pages 135–150. IEEE, 2015.
[21] S. M. Kywe, Y. Li, R. H. Deng, and J. Hong. Detecting camouflaged applications on
mobile application markets. In International Conference on Information Security
and Cryptology, pages 241–254. Springer, 2014.
[22] B. Li, P. Singh, and Q. Wang. Zoom in ios clones: Examining the antecedents and
consequences of mobile app copycats. 2014.
[23] L. Li, T. F. Bissyandé, and J. Klein. Simidroid: Identifying and explaining simi-
larities in android apps. In 2017 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ICESS, pages 136–143.
IEEE, 2017.
[24] L. Li, T. F. Bissyandé, and J. Klein. Rebooting research on detecting repackaged
android apps: Literature review and benchmark. IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, 2019.
[25] L. Metcalf and J. Spring. Domain parking: Not as malicious as expected. Technical
report, CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIV PITTSBURGH PA SOFTWARE ENGINEER-
ING INST, 2014.
[26] F. Quinkert, T. Lauinger, W. Robertson, E. Kirda, and T. Holz. It’s not what it
looks like: Measuring attacks and defensive registrations of homograph domains.
In 2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS), pages
259–267. IEEE, 2019.
[27] J. Szurdi, B. Kocso, G. Cseh, J. Spring, M. Felegyhazi, and C. Kanich. The long âĂĲ-
taileâĂİ of typosquatting domain names. In 23rd {USENIX} Security Symposium
({USENIX} Security 14), pages 191–206, 2014.
[28] C. Tang, S. Chen, L. Fan, L. Xu, Y. Liu, Z. Tang, and L. Dou. A large-scale empirical
study on industrial fake apps. In 2019 IEEE/ACM 41st International Conference on
Software Engineering: Software Engineering in Practice (ICSE-SEIP), pages 183–192.
IEEE, 2019.
[29] K. Tian, S. T. Jan, H. Hu, D. Yao, andG.Wang. Needle in a haystack: Tracking down
elite phishing domains in the wild. In Proceedings of the Internet Measurement
Conference 2018, pages 429–442, 2018.
[30] H. Wang, Z. Liu, J. Liang, N. Vallina-Rodriguez, Y. Guo, L. Li, J. Tapiador, J. Cao,
and G. Xu. Beyond google play: A large-scale comparative study of chinese
android app markets. In Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018,
pages 293–307, 2018.
[31] Y.-M. Wang, D. Beck, J. Wang, C. Verbowski, and B. Daniels. Strider typo-patrol:
Discovery and analysis of systematic typo-squatting. SRUTI, 6(31-36):2–2, 2006.
15
